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Abstract Sometimes ignorance is an excuse. If an agent did not know and could not
have known that her action would realize some bad outcome, then it is plausible to
maintain that she is not to blame for realizing that outcome, even when the act that
leads to this outcome is wrong. This general thought can be brought to bear in the
context of climate change insofar as we think (a) that the actions of individual
agents play some role in realizing climate harms and (b) that these actions are apt
targets for being considered right or wrong. Are agents who are ignorant about
climate change and the way their actions contribute to it excused because of their
ignorance, or is their ignorance culpable? In this paper I examine these questions
from the perspective of recent developments in the theories of responsibility for
ignorant action and characterize their verdicts. After developing some objections to
existing attempts to explore these questions, I characterize two influential theories
of moral responsibility and discuss their implications for three different types of
ignorance about climate change. I conclude with some recommendations for how
we should react to the face of the theories’ conflicting verdicts. The answer to the
question posed in the title, then, is: ‘‘Well, it’s complicated.’’
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The Problem
Sometimes ignorance is an excuse. If an agent did not know and could not have
known that her action would bring about some bad outcome, it is plausible to
maintain that she is not to blame for realizing that outcome. Relatedly, if an agent
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did not know and could not have known that her action was morally impermissible
(perhaps in virtue of the fact that it realized some bad outcome), it is plausible to
maintain that she is not to blame for acting wrongly. These general claims can be
brought to bear in the context of climate change insofar as we think (a) that the
actions of individual agents play some role in realizing climate harms or (b) that
these actions are apt targets for being considered right or wrong. For example, an
energy company CEO might be ignorant of the fact that her choice to implement
some strategy will result in the avoidable production of billions of tons of carbon
dioxide. Similarly, someone who is skeptical of that impact of human activities on
climate might opt for a polluting energy provider instead of a similarly priced
carbon–neutral provider. It is plausible that both of these agents played some role in
the manifestation of future climate harms and it is even more plausible they acted
impermissibly. Establishing each of these claims definitively would be an
interesting and significant task, as would the defense of a moral theory that entails
both that the actions of individuals bear moral significance in the context of climate
ethics and, perhaps relatedly, that there are individual moral obligations to perform
certain climate-harm-mitigating actions. As I discuss below, others have mounted
detailed and complex arguments for these empirical and normative claims, and I for
my purposes I will just stipulate that they hold. My focus here is the distinct
question of whether agents who act on the basis of ignorance of these claims are
excused by their ignorance. For example, does the CEO’s ignorance about the
impact of her decision excuse her from blame? Does the climate science skeptic’s
ignorance about climate science get her off the hook?
In this paper I examine these questions from the perspective of recent
developments in the theories of responsibility for ignorant action and characterize
their verdicts. My first task is to discuss three assumptions that I make in the paper
and introduce a number of important clarifications. The first assumption concerns
the worry that individuals are causally impotent in an important respect. I will
assume that the actions of individuals are capable of realizing climate change-
related harms through their actions. Because the harms related to the extreme
weather events that are linked to human-induced climate change are only diffusely
connected with individual actions, it is not obvious that individuals are capable of
harming the climate at all, much less wrongfully bringing about avoidable climate
harms. Given this, it is not clear that we are justified in treating individual actions as
the relevant unit of moral evaluation, and so it is not clear that the question of
whether individuals are blameworthy for wrongfully, though ignorantly, harming
the environment will even arise. One way of addressing this worry is mathematical.
David Frame calculated that over the course of her life, someone from a wealthy
county will contribute over 800 tons of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere which will
result in about half a billionth of a degree of warming (forthcoming). He calculates
that his amount of warming will shorten people’s lives by several months and that
each year of such emissions will result in shortening lives by one or two days.
Another solution to the causal impotence problem has been developed by Shelly
Kagan who argues that individual actions can make a difference, just so long as the
agent’s action is a member of a set of actions which taken together suffice to bring
about some outcome, which in this case will be some magnification of climate-
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change related harms (2011).1 For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that
some such solution is successful and that the harm brought about by (sets of)
individual actions is indeed significant and can function as a basis on which to
ground the claim that these (sets of) actions are morally impermissible.2 Of course,
further embedded empirical assumptions here are that anthropogenic climate change
is indeed occurring and that the mechanisms by which it is occurring are such that
its course can be affected by future human action. Like most of my interlocutors in
the climate ethics literature, some such empirical background is taken as starting
point for ethical inquiry, and I do the same.
The second assumption is a straightforwardly normative one—I assume that
certain individuals have moral obligations to perform particular actions (or
omissions) on grounds that these actions are in some way relevant to the eventual
realization of climate harms. This is without question a substantive assumption,
since even if one grants that individuals contribute causally to the realization of
climate harms, this does not alone settle the normative question about whether we
have individual obligations not to. Indeed, Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that there
is no plausible moral principle from which it follows that individuals (as opposed to,
say, nations) have moral obligations to diminish their carbon footprints (2010) and
Johnson has argued that climate change has the structure of a tragedy of the
commons and that in that context individuals lack moral obligations to curb their
emissions (2003).3 Others have argued that individuals do in fact have such
obligations. Broome defends the claim that individuals have ‘‘duties of justice’’ to
minimize our carbon footprint and to engage in political actions that might result in
policy changes that mitigate emissions (2012). Cripps argues that we have
individual moral obligations to form collectives that are capable of addressing
climate change on a larger scale (2013).4 Finally Jamieson (2007) and Sandberg
(2011) have each argued that individuals should inculcate ‘‘green virtues’’, which
would involve character traits that dispose one to minimize emissions. Along the
lines suggested by Hursthouse (1998), one could straightforwardly derive claims
about the wrongness of certain individual actions from these virtues. It is obviously
beyond my scope to adjudicate this debate, and for the purposes of exploring the
question of whether individuals are blameworthy for their easily avoidable
emissions, their failure to form collectives that would be able to realise large-
scale emissions reductions, or their failure to inculcate green virtues, I will assume
that the relevant individual moral obligations have some normative foundation.
1 cf: Vanderheiden (2007); Sinnott-Armstrong (2010).
2 Elizabeth Cripps has argued that Kagan’s argument does not apply in the case of climate harms because
there is a disanalogy between the kinds of cases Kagan discusses and the climate change case (2013,
121–123). While I do not dispute that Kagan’s chicken market example (p. 121–128) does not closely
map onto the way in which individual actions might make a difference in the realization of climate
change-related harms, his air-pollution case (p. 129) is a closer fit.
3 For a defense of the claim that it is potentially problematic to view climate change as a collective action
problem, see Hiller (2011) and Hourdequin (2010).
4 On the obligation to contribute to collective efforts to combat or mitigate climate change, see also van
de Poel et al. (2011). For other defenses of the existence of individual moral obligations to address
climate change see: Hourdequin (2010), Hiller (2011), and Morgan-Knapp and Goodman (2014).
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Thirdly and finally, I assume that many actions that result in climate harms are
performed from a state of ignorance about certain relevant empirical and normative
claims. The claims about which the agents in question may be ignorant includes at
one or another of the following:
(a) Ignorance that climate change is occurring
(b) Ignorance that one’s actions contribute in some way to climate change
(c) Ignorance that climate change is bad
(d) Ignorance that one has any individual obligations in the face of the badness of
climate change
(e) Ignorance about how to meet such obligations
(f) Ignorance about the moral significance of mitigating climate change.
(g) Ignorance about which moral theory makes it true that climate change has
moral significance
Agents who violate an obligation to choose a low-emissions option but who are
ignorant in any of these ways may act differently if their ignorance was corrected.
For example, if Ariel believes that climate change is not occurring he might
disregard every opportunity to mitigate his carbon footprint. If his ignorance was
corrected, he might conduct his affairs completely differently, even if none of his
other beliefs or desires also changed. We can imagine that he had all manner of
conditional intentions to use low-carbon energy sources if he was convinced that
climate change was actually occurring, but that these intentions were blocked by his
belief that it is not. Similarly, imagine Bella believes that climate change is
occurring but falsely believes that it is actually a phenomenon to be welcomed.
Again, this belief may be what hinders her from making choices that are climate
change mitigating.5 Finally, imagine Chester believes both that climate change is
occurring and that it is bad, but believes falsely that he has no individual moral
obligations with respect to mitigating it. Perhaps, this is because he thinks the
obligations to do something about it fall entirely on collective agents like national
governments or international coalitions. If he were to see that indeed he does have
individual obligations, Chester might make many different decisions. Thus, Ariel,
Bella, and Chester all act ignorantly in ways that exacerbate climate change, which
raises the question of whether they are culpable either for their ignorance or their
actions based on this ignorance.
5 It may be objected that the kind of empirical claims at issue differs from the kind of claims that are
typically under discussion in the culpable ignorance literature. In her locus classicus ‘‘Culpable
Ignorance’’ Holly Smith’s examples involve ignorance about everyday factual matters rather than claims,
such as those at issue, which are at bottom hypotheses that are supported by scientific inquiry. This
distinction is far from irrelevant given that the way that I avoid being ignorant about, say, whether my
neighbor’s dog is behind my car as I’m backing out is very different from the way I avoid being ignorant
about, say, whether vaccines are harmful. In the former case, I simply need to look and see, and in the
latter I need to defer to reliable epistemic authorities, which may be more difficult to do responsibly.
Avoiding ignorance about climate change would, for most people, involve identifying reliable epistemic
authorities. The fact that this is harder to do than simply looking and seeing seems relevant to the question
of whether someone who defers to unreliable sources is culpably ignorant. Although a complete treatment
of this issue is beyond my scope, these issues do arise in ‘‘Quality of Will Theories’’ section below.
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Importantly, these different species of ignorance can be roughly classified into
non-moral ignorance [(a), (b), and (e)], which is ignorance about certain morally
relevant empirical claims, and moral ignorance [(c), (d), (f), and (g)], which is
ignorance about certain moral claims. Chester’s ignorance is probably of the latter
category. His false belief that only governments are obligated to tackle these issues
might be based on an inaccurate picture of how demanding individual morality is. In
what follows, my focus will be cases of non-moral ignorance because they avoid
certain complications associated with the way quality-of-will theories of moral
responsibility, which is one class of theories that I discuss below, treat cases of
moral ignorance. A more complete treatment of these issues would release this
restriction and examine cases such as Chester’s.
Notice, however, that even non-moral ignorance such as Ariel’s and Bella’s may
lead them to have false moral beliefs as well. Their ignorance of non-moral claims
may lead them to think certain actions are morally permissible when they aren’t. For
example, Ariel may infer from her belief that climate change is not occurring to the
false belief that she has no moral obligation to take steps to mitigate it. Why, after
all, would morality require one to mitigate something that is not occurring? Call this
kind of moral ignorance derivative moral ignorance. It is ignorance about the truth
of a moral claim that derives from non-moral ignorance. This is to be contrasted
with Chester’s false belief that he has no moral obligation to take steps to mitigate
climate change. Since his ignorance of truth of the moral claim that he does have
obligations to take such steps does not derive from non-moral ignorance at all, call
this non-derivative moral ignorance. Thus, even though I am restricting my
attention to non-moral ignorance, I am also concerned by implication with cases of
derivative moral ignorance as well.
With these three assumptions on the table, my target question should be clearer:
When someone is ignorant about some relevant non-moral issue and on the basis of
this ignorance violates an obligation to mitigate harms associated with climate
change, is she blameworthy for her wrong action or its bad outcomes? Before
discussing several different cases of ignorance, I must make two important
clarifications. The first is that the sense of moral responsibility at issue is sometimes
called backward-looking moral responsibility given that it is concerned with the
question of whether certain agents deserve praise or blame for their actions. I am not
addressing the question of whether individuals have forward-looking, substantive
responsibilities or obligations to do their part to mitigate climate change. As stated
above, I am simply stipulating that individuals have such responsibilities and
obligations. My target, which is shared by all of the authors whose work I discuss
below, is whether we are justified in making a further claim about such individuals,
namely that they are backward-looking-responsible for their failures to make efforts
to mitigate harmful anthropogenic changes in the climate.6 Second, I will focus only
on the issue of whether agents are morally responsible for their ignorant actions or
6 For a deeper and more general discussion about the relationships between these two senses of
responsibility (and the various different senses of backward-looking responsibility) in the context of
climate change, see (van de Poel et al. 2011).
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omissions. I set aside the question of whether agents are blameworthy, in an
epistemic sense, simply for being ignorant in any of the ways described above.
One might think that given these assumptions and clarifications that my focus is
overly narrow. I do not deny that I have indeed taken some interesting and important
questions off the table, and I believe that a complete treatment of these issues is
desirable. But, I take it that there are several independent but related reasons to
proceed as I do. The first is simply that I think the arguments below offer an
improvement upon the existing literature on this issue, all of which begins from a
similar set of assumptions. If I were to relax these assumptions or adopt a
substantially different set of assumptions, this project could not be seen as an
advance on these discussions. Second, in addition to thinking that it is bad or wrong
for individuals to contribute to climate harms, we also think that certain individuals
can be blameworthy for wrongfully failing to do something that seeks to mitigate
climate harms. Our moral discourse with regard to this and other areas is richer than
merely judgments and discussions concerning what people morally should and
should not do. Once we accept that individual obligations exist it is only natural to
inquire into whether agents meet the conditions of moral responsibility with respect
to their actions. Once this further question is posed and once it is noticed that the
agent’s knowledge about what she has done (or lack thereof) is relevant to her
responsibility for it, we must engage in the sort of inquiry that follows. Third, and
most importantly, the question of responsibility that I take up is a vital one for any
theory that indexes the strength of forward-looking responsibilities to, say, facilitate
adaption to a warmer climate or to compensate those who suffer from climate harms
to claims about whether individuals are to blame for wrongfully contributing to the
problem. For example, Baer argues that fairness in distribution of adaptation costs
turns on inter alia the issue of moral responsibility for climate harms (2006).
Indeed, he speaks directly to the main topic of this paper when he says: ‘‘Although I
argued that ignorance of harmful effects does not eliminate ethical and legal
liability, there is little doubt that it is a relevant factor in considering exactly how
liability should be limited’’ (p. 139). So, although I hew to what seems like a narrow
set of issues in this paper, they should be of broad interest both because they
advance a burgeoning topic in the climate change literature and because of their
relevance to anyone who thinks that we have individual moral obligations to
contribute to the mitigation of climate change harms and, perhaps, to shoulder the
costs of either adapting to a warmer planet or perhaps making changes to the planet
that counteract whatever climactic changes occur.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In ‘‘Some Stories of Ignorance’’
section, I introduce three different ways in which agents might become ignorant of
climate change. In all three cases the agents fail to perform the same obligatory
emissions-curbing action due to their ignorance. After discussing some shortcom-
ings in present attempts to categorize ignorance in these cases as culpable or not, I
move on in ‘‘Two Theories of Moral Responsibility for Ignorant Actions and
Verdicts’’ section to examine two recent theories of culpable ignorance, and I show
what these theories would entail regarding the culpability of the three ignorance
types. ‘‘Upshots’’ section summarizes several theoretical and practical upshots. To
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foreshadow: the answer to the question posed in the title is ‘‘it depends…perhaps
less often than you think’’.
Some Stories of Ignorance
I will argue below that the precise way in which ignorance about climate harms
affects moral responsibility for causing such harms depends crucially on the details
of the case. I think however that it is constructive to work with three general classes
of ignorant agents because it is plausible that many actual cases of ignorance fall
under this categorization scheme. Consider the following three cases.
Strategic ignorance Strat is building a home. Like all other home-builders, he
faces many, many decisions. He must choose the number of bathrooms, the color
of the brick, the window size and so on. He is also faced with the choice of
whether to implement an expensive pallet of energy-efficient technologies into
the construction. Strat doesn’t follow developments about climate change
carefully, but he knows enough to know that it might be something to look into.
He knows for instance that he plans to live in the house for some time, and that
the impact of implementing these energy-efficient technologies will be substan-
tial. He also knows that if he asked his neighbor, who happens to be a well-
respected climate scientist, whether there really are strong reasons to diminish
one’s carbon footprint, she might give him evidence both that climate change is
real and that he should opt for the green technologies. Because of the chance that
his neighbor might tell him that things are quite dire and that he should definitely
go green, he chooses not to ask and ignorantly goes with the cheaper and less
efficient energy consuming construction.
Texas ignorance Tex7 is also building a home, and he must make all the same
decisions as Strat. One difference though is that he does follow developments
about the causes of climate change avidly. However, the developments he follows
are filtered through the slate of hyper-conservative news sources that he and
generations of his family have always followed exclusively. Over the years this
has lead to Tex’s strong disposition to be skeptical toward the findings of climate
scientists, all of whom he takes to be brainwashed leftists who are hell-bent on
propagating socialism through their environmental agenda. Despite all of this,
Tex could come to know that climate change is real and that he should opt for the
green technologies, but it would be very difficult. Ignorant that he should go
green, he goes with the cheaper and less efficient energy consuming
construction.8
7 Note that the author is a proud Texan and does not wish to impugn himself or any other Texan by using
this example. The choice of Texas is motivated by the fact the congressional and senate delegation from
Texas has more climate change deniers, both in number and in percentage than any other state. See: http://
thinkprogress.org/climate-denier-caucus-114th-congress/#TX.
8 Fouke (2012, 120) discusses a similar example and argues that a Tex-like individual would be
blameworthily ignorant because, despite the magnitude of the risks, he fails to be sufficiently diligent in
educating himself. In the discussion below I discuss the problems with such a move.
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Normal ignorance Norm is also building a home, and he must make all the same
decisions as Tex and Strat. Like Strat, he doesn’t follow climate science at all, but
unlike Strat, it doesn’t even occur to him that he should look into it. Norm is
either not that thoughtful about these kinds of decisions or he doesn’t believe that
his actions will ever impact ‘‘bigger’’ problems. He could come to know that
climate change is real and that he should opt for the green technologies, and it
wouldn’t be at all difficult. Unlike Tex, Norm wouldn’t have to go against
ingrained skepticism of anything he read about it. But, still Norm doesn’t look
into it. Ignorant that climate change is a serious threat to human well being and,
thus, that he should build green, he goes with the cheaper and less efficient energy
consuming construction.
Strat, Tex, and Norm are all ignorant both about the threat posed by our changing
climate and, derivatively, that they should take steps to diminish their carbon
footprint, which in this case calls for utilizing energy efficient construction.9 They
are ignorant about much else, not doubt, but it will do for the sake of what follows to
focus on these bits of ignorance. The question of whether they are morally
responsible for their ignorant actions can be addressed by inquiring into the related
question of whether they are culpable for their ignorance. Although blameless
ignorance seems to constitute an excuse, agents who are culpably ignorant seem to
lack such an excuse. Such agents meet what’s called the epistemic condition of
moral responsibility and can be blameworthy for their wrong actions despite their
ignorance of some situation or state of affairs that is morally relevant and indeed
their ignorance that they are doing anything impermissible.10
This issue has received relatively scant attention in the literature in climate
ethics, and little of it has made contact with the developing literature on the
epistemic condition of responsibility. Steven Vanderheiden has argued that these
cases should be analyzed as negligence cases (2007). On such an analysis, ignorance
would count as culpable if in coming to be ignorant, an agent falls short of some
reasonable person standard. If someone fails to believe whatever a reasonable
person would have believed then the ignorant agent believes negligently. Thus, if a
reasonable person would believe both that climate change is occurring and that
builders should take certain steps that mitigate contributions to it, then one might
argue that agents like Strat, Tex, and Norm are negligent in their ignorance.
Vanderheiden seems to embrace something like this line in the following:
9 Nothing of substance hangs on my choice of the particular obligation in this case. I chose it only
because of the potential for very significant emissions reductions to be traced to this one decision. In this
respect, it differs from the oft discussed and controversial case of taking a leisurely drive in one’s SUV.
As I discuss in ‘‘Upshots’’ section, one might substitute the home-builder’s obligation to utilize low-
emissions construction for any of the obligations that have been defended in the literature. For example,
one could construct cases in which the agent’s ignorance about climate change leads them to opt against
forming or joining some collective that will tackle climate change, which is what Cripps (2013) argues we
as individuals are obligated to do. Also, though it may seem natural to read these as cases of having the
forward-looking responsibility to use efficient materials, the question in this section is whether they are
morally responsible in the backward-looking sense for failing to do so.
10 The literature on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility is flourishing. For an overview, see
Robichaud and Wieland (forthcoming).
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Twelve years after the Rio Declaration committing developing nations to
greenhouse gas abatement, and with three scrupulously researched and widely
disseminated Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment
Reports, claims to reasonable ignorance concerning anthropogenic climate
change are fully implausible, despite the uncertainties that remain in climate
science. Even if the predictions about the harmful consequences of climate
change turn out to be overstated, ignoring the considered recommendations of
the vast majority of the world’s scientific community can only be described as
willful ignorance, and cannot exonerate one from moral responsibility for
resultant harm (2007, 91).
Vanderheiden’s appeal to a negligence analysis is instructive but underdevel-
oped. First, it does not suffice to establish the content of what a reasonable person
would believe about climate science by pointing to the existence of a broad
scientific consensus. This kind of consensus exists for many topics in science, yet
we do not think it follows that non-scientists who are ignorant of consensus beliefs
in these areas have beliefs that are not reasonable. Even in cases where much hangs
on whether one’s beliefs accord with the scientific consensus (e.g. health risks of
smoking and not exercising), the question of what the reasonable person would
believe is at bottom a normative issue that is not settled by the mere existence of a
consensus.11 Second, and relatedly, there is a lot of controversy about how the
reasonable person standard should be set. According to some legal scholars, the
reasonable person standard should be an objective one that abstracts from particular
features of the agent in question and simply asks, given some situation and the
relevant bodies of knowledge, what is it reasonable to expect anyone to believe or
be aware of (Hart 1968)? Others think that no such objective reasonable person
standard should set the boundaries of negligent action and belief formation. Instead,
the standard should be subjectivized to certain features of the agent. This
subjectivized standard would be influenced by the agent’s particular dispositions to
believe and process evidence (Dressler 2001). According to an objective standard,
Strat, Tex, and Norm might all be negligent in their ignorant failures to utilize
energy efficient construction, but a subjective standard might result in a different
verdict. Tex for example may be non-negligently ignorant given that he currently
has the disposition to be skeptical about any claims made by scientists about climate
change. It is plausible that ignoring them, rather than being an instance of willing
and presumably objectionable ignorance, would constitute a reasonable, and indeed
rational response to his evidence.12
A richer treatment of culpability for climate change ignorance is found in work
by Daniel Fouk. He argues that the blameworthiness in ignorance cases can be
established in two different ways. First, an ignorant agent will be blameworthy if
11 For a discussion of the reasonable person standard as it would apply in the context of meeting the
epistemic condition of moral responsibility, see Sher (2009, 100–104).
12 For a discussion of the pitfalls of appeals to the reasonable person standard in cases of culpable
ignorance in discussions outside the legal context, see (Sher 2009, 97–104).
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her ignorance traces to a ‘‘benighting act’’, which is a prior ignorance-producing
action that the agent performs knowingly.13 If, for example, a physician knows
both that a certain study has been published with important findings about the
dangers of a popular drug and that for this reason she should read it but chooses
not to read it, her failure to read it is a benighting act (or, in this case,
omission).14 On this view if she were to harm a patient by prescribing this drug,
then her ignorance about the dangers would not excuse her. A second way to
establish blameworthiness in ignorance cases is to show that failing to become
informed, the agent failed to engage in a certain ‘‘moral reflection’’, about the
permissibility of one’s actions.15 On this account, ignorance need not trace to a
benighting action that was performed wittingly. Rather, one need only show that
the ignorance was the product of a failure to reflect on what sort of information is
relevant to the situation at hand. For example, if rather than thinking that she
really should read that article, the physician just failed even to consider that it was
important for her to do so, she would have failed to engage in the kind of
reflection that can be expected given the stakes, which in this case are quite high.
Her ignorance would be culpable and she would be blameworthy for her
subsequent ignorant act of harming her patients, even though there was no
unwittingly performed benighting action. Fouke argues that many agents who are
ignorant about climate change would be culpably ignorant according to this
second view. He notes that given the very high stakes, individuals who are
ignorant about climate change ought to have engaged in the kind of serious
inquiry and investigation that would have extinguished their ignorance. Strat and
Norm, for example, simply ought to have undergone moral reflection regarding
the impact of their decisions. The same would seem to be true for Tex, even
though he is strongly disposed against conducting such a reflection.
Fouke’s discussion is helpful because, unlike Vanderheiden, he appeals to the
literature on culpable ignorance and negligence. However, I think that more recent
developments in this area cast doubt on the success of his treatments, especially as it
concerns the latter way of establishing culpability. To anticipate the following
section, the claim that agents have certain obligations to engage in moral reflection
is yet another moral failure that can be performed ignorantly or not. If it is
performed ignorantly, as it would be if the agent failed to realize that given the
stakes she should reflect and investigate, then this is simply another ignorant failure
to conform to one’s obligations. The problem has simply been pushed back a step.
In the following section, I will carefully explicate two alternative ways of
accounting for moral responsibility for ignorant actions, and I detail what these
accounts would say about the cases of Strat, Tex, and Norm.
13 Fouke is drawing on Holly Smith’s ‘‘Culpable Ignorance’’(1983).
14 Assume that circumstances are such that it would be easy for her to do so.
15 Here Fouke draws from Steven Sverdlik’s ‘‘Pure Negligence’’(1993).
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Two Theories of Moral Responsibility for Ignorant Actions and Verdicts
The two most influential theories in the culpable ignorance literature are called
‘‘volitionist’’ and ‘‘quality of will’’ theories. Both theories emphasize the etiology of
ignorance. According to the first family of views, blameworthiness for ignorant
action must trace to blameworthy management of one’s beliefs, where the
management of beliefs in taken to be a matter of performing certain investigative or
reflective actions that are actual moral requirements. According to the second family
of views, culpability for ignorance is determined by the ‘quality of will’ expressed
by the agent who fails to inform herself. My goal of the section is to assess what the
verdicts are of each theory for the three cases of ignorance discussed above.
Volitionist Theories
Volitionism is an influential view recently developed by Michael Zimmerman
(1997), Rosen (2004, 2008) and Neil Levy (2009). According to volitionism, agents
are culpable for ignorant actions only if they trace to a particular type of witting
belief mismanagement. According to Rosen, we all have certain ‘‘procedural
epistemic obligations’’, which, roughly, are moral obligations to engage in
particular kinds of actions that have predictable epistemic upshots. Examples of
such obligations include checking the expiration date on medications or checking
one’s rearview mirror while backing out. Procedural epistemic obligations earn their
normative force because compliance with them diminishes the likelihood of
ignorance that, if acted upon, might lead to subsequent wrong or harmful actions. It
is plausible that given the impact of certain of our actions on the climate that we
have procedural epistemic obligations to investigate the magnitude of climate
impact posed by our actions. Since the choice of construction will have is bound
significantly to impact the carbon footprint of living in it, home-builders like Strat,
Tex, and Norm have procedural epistemic obligations to investigate the impact of
the various construction options they are presented with. If these agents have this
procedural epistemic obligation, then the ignorance that traces to it is a candidate for
culpable ignorance on the volitionist’s view.
Before moving on to a more careful analysis of these three cases, I must highlight
another central feature of the volitionist’s position. This is the claim that culpable
ignorance must trace to a witting failure to conform with one’s procedural epistemic
obligations. The volitionist’s argument for this claim, which I alluded to above, is
that it won’t do to say that an agent’s culpability rests only on her failure to conform
to a procedural epistemic obligation. Assume that a given agent should have
inquired into whether climate change was a real and worrisome phenomenon, but
didn’t. We can ask if this omission was performed ignorantly or not. If it was not an
ignorant omission, that is, if the agent believed that she should have looked into
whether climate change was a real and worrisome phenomenon, but nevertheless
chose not to do so, then she non-ignorantly fails to conform with her procedural
epistemic obligations. On this basis, volitionists maintain that such an agent would
be culpable for her ignorance about the reality of climate change.
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If, on the other hand, her failure to look into whether climate change is real and
worrisome was also performed in ignorance—if the agent didn’t take herself to have
the obligation to look into this—then her ignorance-perpetuating failure to conform
to her procedural epistemic obligations is itself an ignorant omission. Thus, we can
only establish that an agent is culpable for this failure to look into things (and for the
subsequent ignorance about climate change) by tracing the agent’s ignorance about
her obligation to look into things to some still prior procedural epistemic obligation
to investigate or reflect. The relevant prior procedural epistemic obligation might
involve the kinds of inquiry that would be conducive to believing that one ought to
look into the issue of climate change. Perhaps one ought to look into engaging in
serious inquiry about the most serious ethical issues that we currently face as a
global community. The result of such an inquiry, may well be the formation of a
belief that one ought to investigate the reality and seriousness of global climate
change, which is the procedural epistemic obligation of which we have been
assuming our agent is unaware.
Imagine, now, that our ignorant agent also failed to conduct this ‘meta-inquiry’.
Again, this failure itself will either be ignorant or not. If it is not—if the agent
actually believed that she should engage in serious inquiry about what kinds of
inquiry she should engage in—then she will be culpable for failing to know that she
should inquire into the climate change issue and, thus, she will also be culpable for
failing to believe that it poses a threat to well-being. If an agent knowingly fails to
conduct some procedural epistemic obligation, even at this higher level, then she
will be culpable for the resulting ignorance. If, on the other hand, her failure to
conduct this meta-inquiry is also an ignorant failure, as it would be if she failed to
believe that she ought to engage in serious inquiry about the most serious ethical
issues that we currently face as a global community, then we have pushed the
problem back yet another step. According to volitionism, her culpability for her
ignorant failure to conduct this meta-inquiry (i.e. to investigate whether she should
investigate whether climate change is real) must rest on some still prior procedural
epistemic obligation, namely the obligation to investigate whether one should
investigate whether one should investigate whether climate change is real. The only
way to halt this regress and establish that someone is culpably ignorant for some
belief and for subsequent ignorant omissions and their effects is to locate a knowing
or witting failure to conform to one’s procedural epistemic obligations. Absent some
knowing failure to perform one’s procedural epistemic obligation at some point in
the etiology of the ignorance, the question will arise whether their failure to know
that they had some procedural epistemic obligation was itself ignorant. Culpability
for ignorance can only be established by ruling out this further question. As
Zimmerman puts it:
‘‘Every chain of culpability is such that at its origin lies an item of behavior for
which the agent is directly culpable and which the agent believed at the time at
which the behavior occurred to be morally wrong’’ (2010, 176)
Now that the outlines and motivation of volitionism are clear, it is time to see
how it would classify the three cases of ignorance introduced above. Start first with
Norm. Recall that Norm could come to know that climate change is real and that he
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should opt for the green technologies, but it simply does not cross his mind to look
into things. If it failed even to cross his mind that he should examine the question of
whether climate change is occurring, then he does not knowingly or wittingly fall
short of any procedural epistemic obligation to investigate the reality of climate
change. Note that it does not follow from the fact that it did not cross his mind to
investigate the matter, that he lacked the procedural epistemic obligation to do so.
We can assume that Norm has this obligation, and we can even assume that
complying with it would have been relatively easy given the abundance of available
information. Still Norm’s falling short of his procedural epistemic obligation does
not suffice to make his resulting ignorance culpable. Volitionists can only ground
culpable ignorance in witting failures. It follows that his ignorance is non-culpable,
and thus that he is not blameworthy for his ignorant failure to utilize green
construction materials nor presumably for all the ensuing and easily avoidable
emissions. The same result would seem to hold for Tex. He is far from believing
that he ought to examine the question of whether climate change is occurring, given
that he already believes explicitly, on what may seem to others like very shaky
grounds, that it is not occurring. At no point does he knowingly fail to investigate
the climate change issue. And, given his history, it is not that he comes to his
skepticism about climate change, which is fueled by a slate of regularly reinforced
false beliefs, via any kind of knowing or witting belief mismanagement. We can
assume that Tex, like many others who form their beliefs in what might be called
poor epistemic neighborhoods, thinks he is thinking carefully, and that he is taking
no witting epistemic risks. Thus, volitionists would hold that Tex is also non-
culpably ignorant about climate change.
Before moving on to discuss Strat’s strategic ignorance, it is worthwhile to pause
and take stock what volitionism entails generally for culpable ignorance about
climate change. I chose these cases because they plausibly typify the way in which
many people come to have their false beliefs about climate change. Norm is like
anyone else affected by incuriosity or basic insensitivity to what is a highly
significant problem facing all humans. Many individuals simply do not bother
themselves with concerns beyond those near and dear. Effects that are not tangible
may not register as compelling enough to warrant anything approaching careful
consideration. People who are struck with this kind of incuriosity or insensitivity to
their role in realizing harms brought about by climate change may suffer a deficit of
intellectual virtue, and indeed they may even harbor intellectual vice. This does not
suffice, however, to establish culpability on the volitionist’s view, unless these
deficits were developed in the knowledge that they are risking ignorance about
morally significant facts, that is in the knowledge that the agents are violating
procedural epistemic obligations. For any case where this kind of witting belief
mismanagement does not occur somewhere in the etiology of the false belief that
climate change is not occurring, the agent in question would not be culpably
ignorant.
Tex’s situation is distinct from Norm’s, but it is no less recognizable. Indeed, in
certain regions, it may be just as common. Unfortunately, the public discussion
about climate science in these regions is dominated by well-funded, badly informed
and loquacious purveyors of falsehoods who are skilled at packaging their views in
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ways that make them seem legitimate, even to careful observers.16 Climate
scientists and well-informed journalists are in the unfortunate situation of having to
combat these typically politically motivated forces as they try to get the truth out.
Even well-intentioned, truth-seeking individuals who find themselves in this milieu
may find it difficult to navigate the competing voices. If this is the environment
within which Tex formed his beliefs about climate change, then it should not be
surprising that he comes out a skeptic who does not believe that he has any
obligation to look any further into the matter. It is plausible of course that over time
Tex comes to believe that he should reexamine his grounds for skepticism. If this
were to occur, and if he opted not to do so, then he would be on the hook for on
volitionist grounds. Absent this, however, it’s plausible then to think that Tex and
people like him are not blameworthy for their ignorance. Moreover, on the
assumption that being blameworthy for ignorance is a necessary condition for being
blameworthy for ignorant action, he and his ilk would not be blameworthy for any
failures to mitigate climate harms that are predicated on that ignorance.
Strat’s case of strategic ignorance is trickier to analyze in the volitionist’s
framework. In the given case description, it is not clear whether Strat believes that
he should investigate whether climate change is real. It could be that he indeed
believes this, in which case he would be culpably ignorant. This culpability would
be consistent with claiming that he is blameworthy for his ignorant failure to take
steps toward climate change mitigation. However, Strat’s hesitation about asking his
neighbor about climate science might stem from his own belief that it would be
good or perhaps prudent to investigate whether antrhopogenic climate change is
occurring. One may take oneself to have (really) strong reasons to look into things
without taking oneself to have an obligation to do so. If this were the case for Strat,
then the volitionist’s condition would not be met and so neither Strat’s ignorance
and his ignorant action would be blameworthy.
It follows, given the volitionist’s necessary conditions on blameworthy
ignorance, that few agents would be culpable for their ignorance about climate
change. This result stems from the relative scarcity of witting belief-mismanage-
ment in the context of climate change. It’s plausible to suppose that, like Norm, Tex,
and one way of reading Strat, people normally construct their raft of false beliefs by
conducting their epistemic affairs in ways they themselves fail so see as flawed. The
implications this view has for the question of individual moral responsibility for
climate change associated harms is significant. It shows that even if the issues of
establishing a causal link between individual action and climate harms are solved, it
may still be the case that many, if not most individuals would fail to be morally
responsible for failing to mitigate climate change, given that they act from
ignorance that is not culpable.
16 Just how bad the public discourse is in a given region is an empirical matter, and so it is an open
question just how representative Tex’s context is. To get some idea about how prevalent climate-change
deniers are in the national and local media in the United States, the website Media Matters has compiled
over 1685 instances of climate change science being called into question since 2004. See: http://
mediamatters.org/issues/climate-change. Also relevant here is the fact that one of the two main political
parties is comprised overwhelmingly of vocal climate change deniers, and it stands alone among con-
servative political parties as ‘‘an anomaly in denying climate change’’ (Ba˚tstrand 2015).
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Quality of Will Theories
One prominent way of responding to the volitionist is to argue that moral
responsibility for ignorance and ignorant action can be established by showing that
the ignorant agent displayed a lack of good will. On such views, an agent’s
blameworthiness rests on the quality of her will and need not trace back to witting
belief mismanagement. Quality of will theorists maintain that agents are responsible
for ignorant actions only if their actions reflect their normative standpoint, where
this standpoint expresses an insufficient lack of concern. Although this view has
many proponents and variations the details do not matter for present purposes.17
Nomy Arpaly defends an influential version of this view according to which agents
are blameworthy for their actions to the degree that their actions stem from a lack of
good will (2002, 129–132). On her view, to say that an agent acts from a lack of
good will is just to say that the agent fails to respond to the relevant moral reasons.
Applying such views are relatively straightforward in non-ignorance cases. Suppose
I know that climate change is a serious moral issue and that I know that I should
utilize green materials in my construction projects. If I nevertheless choose not to
utilize green materials because I find all the other options are aesthetically more
desirable, then I fail to respond appropriately to relevant moral reasons—they are
not sufficiently moving for me.
Quality of will theories can yield clear verdicts in cases of ignorant actions as
well, though it can be trickier. For example, Arpaly discusses the case of Solomon, a
sexist whose false beliefs about how women deserve to be treated are perpetuated by
his ignorance about certain facts about women. She imagines that Solomon was
raised in a milieu that stunted his moral development by sheltering him from certain
facts that would make it more difficult for his sexist beliefs to persist (2002, 103–4).
On her analysis, if this sexist escaped this environment and was confronted daily
with evidence that women have all the morally relevant qualities that men have, we
would expect him to change his tune. If his belief that say, ‘women are less
intellectually capable than men’ were to survive even in the face of many obvious
counterexamples, then Arpaly suggests that this manifests a lack of good will. This
agent’s ignorance about these factual matters is often classified as ‘motivated
ignorance’ (Moody-Adams 1994) and it is based on an agent’s failure to be
sufficiently concerned to form accurate beliefs about the issue.18 Though the details
of various quality of will views matter, it suffices for my purposes to adopt Arpaly’s
version and see how it applies to the cases. The central question about the cases is
whether Norm, Strat, and Tex are relevantly similar to Arpaly’s Solomon. Is their
ignorance that climate change is a serious threat the manifestation of a failure to
respond to relevant moral reasons? In other words, are they insufficiently concerned
with the issue of climate change in a way that would make them culpable for their
ignorance about climate change?
17 Though there are many defenders of this kind of theory, a recent one is (McKenna 2012).
18 Here I am glossing over subtle issues about how we come to know when an agent displays an
insufficient responsiveness to moral reasons. For a detailed treatment of this issue see King (2009, 584).
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Before bringing the quality of will view to bear on the three cases, it is instructive
to briefly contrast this approach with the volitionist’s. The starkest contrast is that
the quality of will theorist need not trace ignorance to an instance where the agent
knew she should investigate something but simply chose not to. For this reason, it
does not produce the troubling implication that agents are only very rarely
blameworthy for ignorant action. One other important point of contrast is that
quality of will views can more straightforwardly account for the judgment that
someone is blameworthy to some degree or other. The volitionist requires that an
agent’s blameworthiness for ignorantly contributing to climate change must trace to
the witting mismanagement of belief. If this necessary condition is met, then there is
one less barrier to thinking that an agent is blameworthy for her ignorant action. It is
not clear, however, how we could read off of this the claim that the agent is
blameworthy to some degree. By contrast, one feature of quality of will views is that
the degree of blameworthiness of ignorant agents is a function of the degree to
which their ignorance manifests a lack of good will. Since the latter admits readily
of degrees, the former should as well. The thought here is that an ignorant agent
might manifest a greater deficit of good will, if he would be ignorant in
counterfactual worlds where the evidence to which she fails to respond is stronger
and more salient.19 As I will argue below, this feature of quality of will views may
enable one to make elucidating distinctions between the cases.
Let’s start again with Norm. Does his failure to investigate climate change
express or manifest a lack of good will? More precisely, does the fact that it never
crosses Norm’s mind to look into the seriousness of climate change indicate a
failure to respond to the moral reasons that underlie an obligation to do so? These
reasons presumably have to do with inter alia the various threats to human well
being posed by climate change. There are various explanations for why Norm might
fail to respond to these reasons. One possible explanation for Norm’s failure to
respond to reasons to investigate is that he has a standing belief that he lacks the
time or ability to affect ‘big problems’, such as climate change. This might
contribute to his disposition to find any reason to read about or otherwise investigate
climate change less salient. Call this version of the case Ineffectual-Norm. We can
imagine that, for similar reasons of feeling causally impotent, Ineffectual-Norm also
does not vote or otherwise participate actively in the democratic process where he
lives. On the basis of this belief, he’s adopted a general policy of just putting his
head down and focusing on what seems to him to be tangible problems. When faced
with the option of greener construction, he might dismiss it immediately on grounds
of cost, his budget being one of the spheres within which he can manifest tangible
effects. A similar tendency also results in his failure to believe that he should look
into climate change. For him the thought of delving into the issue seems moot given
that it’s a ‘big problem’ for ‘big, powerful people’ to sort out.
A second way of filling in the details is more straightforward. Imagine that Norm
is just totally thoughtless about the effects that his actions might have. In this
version of the case he doesn’t even have a standing belief that his actions are likely
19 For a detailed attempts at fleshing out how quality of will accounts admit of degrees of
blameworthiness, see Arpaly (2006) and Nelkin (2016, 361–366).
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to be ineffectual. He simply fails to consider the downstream impact of his choices
and focuses instead on the here and now. Call this Dense-Norm. Though both
Norms fail even to consider whether climate change is really a threat, the verdict
that the quality of will theorist should come to depends on which of these
explanations holds.
Does Ineffectual-Norm express a bad quality of will? Norm’s ignorance about his
obligation to investigate climate change is predicated on the belief that he can do
nothing to combat climate change. The question for the quality of will theorist is
then whether Norm’s forming this belief and his subsequent failure to investigate
climate change express a lack of good will. There are readings of this case that are
consistent with a negative answer. Ineffectual-Norm’s modesty with respect to what
he can accomplish through his actions may be an honest mistake, rooted in nothing
more than an understandably low estimation of his relative significance in affecting
matters on such a large scale. Every time he gives into this tendency and fails to
investigate, it may be regrettable, and we might even be justified in each case in
intervening to try and change his mind. But, to attribute a lack of good will for this
seems unjustified.
On another reading, however, Ineffectual-Norm’s modesty might seem to shade
into an objectionable kind of complacency or stubbornness, either of which would
indeed constitute a lack of good will. In Arplay’s discussion of Solomon, she notes
that should his false beliefs about what women are capable of persist even after he
has relocated to a society where he is exposed to many counterexamples, Solomon
would reveal himself to have an objectionable lack of concern for getting things
right with respect to morally relevant empirical beliefs about the capabilities of
women (2002, 104). Solomon and perhaps this second version of Ineffectual-Norm
would, through their ignorance, show that they have the quality of will that entails
that they are culpably ignorant.
Dense-Norm raises similar issues but in a different way. It never even occurs to
him to think about his abilities with respect to affecting climate. He is like the
foodie who, despite ample reason to believe that omnivorism contributes to much
avoidable animal suffering, simply does not ever take it seriously enough to look
into it and may reside in a community in which the welfare of animals raised for
food is simply not the topic of much discussion. Though it may be difficult for
readers of this journal to believe, some individuals really may simply never stop to
think about climate change. Dense-Norm may never consume media in which it is
mentioned, and he may not be part of social networks in which it is brought up as a
topic. In these respects, he would resemble Solomon quite closely. If this is right,
then Dense-Norm’s ignorance may not trace to a lack of good will after all. Rather,
he resides in a milieu in which even someone with admirable moral concern may
fail to investigate and thus fail to know about climate change. On the quality of will
view, this version of Dense-Norm would be blameless. However, also like Solomon,
should Dense-Norm’s ignorance persist after repeated exposure to evidence that
climate change is an issue of significant moral importance, then his incuriosity
would begin to reflect a lack of good will.
It’s possible, though that Dense-Norm’s dispositions have more pernicious roots.
Perhaps his incuriosity with respect to the science and moral significance of climate
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change is an aspect of a general self-centeredness that makes him wholly or mostly
unresponsive to considerations that motivate even the most modest inquiry into both
near- and long-term effects of his actions. Such a systematic lack of concern might
in fact be an indication of a lack of good will after all, and would be consistent with
the judgment that Dense-Norm is culpably ignorant after all. The difference
between this version of Dense-Norm and the previous one is that one would expect
his ignorance to persist even if he were to become aware of a possible link between
his actions and climate change. His self-centeredness would wall off any avenues of
inquiry, whereas his dense but not self-centered counterpart may well respond to
what are now very salient reasons for inquiry.
This discussion of four versions of Dense-Norm reveals the care with which one
must bring a quality of will approach to bear on specific cases of ignorance. The
question of whether Dense-Norm’s failure even to consider issues about climate
change and the potential contribution of his actions to it indicates a lack of good
will, can only be determined by carefully understanding why the issue is not on his
radar. Different explanations will yield different characterizations of his quality of
will and, thus, different judgments as to Norm’s culpability for ignorance about
climate change.
The application of quality of will theories to Tex is also somewhat tricky. Recall
that Tex inhabits an epistemic bad neighborhood. Climate change skeptics are
plentiful and effective at getting their message out. This context certainly plays
some role in explaining Tex’s beliefs about the reliability of climate scientists and
his attendant ignorance about climate change. The central question for the quality of
will theorist, however, is whether holding these beliefs and being ignorant about
climate change are manifestations of a lack of good will. As before, the details
matter. It is certainly possible that another factor explaining Tex’s ignorance is a
genuine lack of good will, say, toward people with fancy college degrees. Perhaps
he simply fails to see warnings by scientists as anything more than missives from
over-educated, self-important ‘readers’, and he has closed his mind to reconsidering
this attitude. Though it’s true that it is easier for Tex to be Tex in his current
environment than it would be were he to reside in a region that was less awash with
propaganda, Tex’s ignorance in this case seems clearly to derive from a lack of good
will. According to this interpretation, Tex would qualify as culpably ignorant. The
sources are available to him, and he has the capacity to consume them (given that he
readily consumes conservative media sources who are perpetuating misinforma-
tion). Note, however, that it would be difficult for Tex to see through all the white
noise and come to hold true beliefs and, because of this, one might be inclined to
think that his culpability is somewhat mitigated. Although the question of precisely
how difficulty affects blameworthiness is too broad to take on in this paper, it is
plausible to think that difficulty does mitigate blame in some contexts, and it is clear
that Tex, and many of his compatriots must navigate a much tougher road to the
truth than many others.20
20 For recent explorations of the effect of difficulty on moral responsibility, and blameworthiness in
particular, see (Bradford, forthcoming). The issue of whether blameworthiness comes in degrees is
relevant topic that is increasingly discussed. See Coates and Swenson (2012) and Nelkin (2016). For my
purposes, I assume that difficulty can impact the degree of one’s blameworthiness.
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The case of Strat receives the most straightforward application of the quality of
will view. One of the most straightforward ways of displaying lack of concern for
something is to act recklessly with respect to it. Since Strat is sufficiently informed
about the possible threat of climate change, and since he knows his neighbor is a
reliable source of further information about it, it is hard not to classify his failure to
inquire as reckless risk-taking. The fact that he’s willing to take this risk is telling.
He would rather ignorantly potentially contribute to an extremely serious problem
than come to believe that climate change is real, a belief, the holding of which
would make it more difficult for him to simply go for the cheaper, less-green
construction materials. This displays a straightforward lack of concern for the moral
issue at hand, and suffices to ground his culpability for ignorance on the quality of
will view.
Upshots
This extended discussion of Strat, Tex, and Norm has greater relevance than merely
cataloging what volitionists and quality of will theorists are committed to saying
about a collection of hypothetical cases. The three cases, together with their
variants, cover a wide spectrum of ways in which agents might come to be ignorant
about what many take to be one of the most important moral issues we currently
face. For this reason, it is instructive to know when the two theories converge in
their judgments and when they do not. The volitionist and quality of will views of
moral responsibility both entail that agents who engage in strategic ignorance are
culpable for their ignorance, and presumably, for their ignorant actions.
Where they diverge, however, we perhaps have reason to be less confident in the
judgments they issue and in our own judgments about the divergent cases. The
theories diverge for cases like Tex in which the ignorant agents reside in societies
that for some reason or other are unfavorable having veridical beliefs about climate
science and thus about one’s moral obligations with respect to mitigating it. On the
one hand, and this is the volitionist’s point, they certainly don’t knowingly avoid
reliable sources of information, given that their influences have painted them as
unreliable. On the other hand, and this is the quality of will theorist’s point, such
agents seem to display a lack of concern by failing to look sufficiently carefully at
the data and for being overly dismissive of what are in reliable sources of
information. This mixed verdict shows, at a minimum, that there is an important
difference between strategic ignorance cases, where the two theories converged, and
cases where reliable sources of information are obscured, which lead to divergent
verdicts.
Convergence is only partial in cases in which ignorant agents are just
unthoughtful about climate change. When their unthoughtfulness does not derive
from complacency or stubbornness (as it did in the second variant of Ineffectual
Norm) or self-centeredness (as it did in the the second variant of Dense Norm) then
unthoughtfulness might be an understandable and honest mistake (as it seemed to be
in the first variants of the Ineffectual and Dense Norm). These would be non-
culpable ignorance cases on both accounts of culpable ignorance. However, when
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an agent’s unthoughtfulness is tied to these vices, then they would be culpably
ignorant only according to a quality of will account; volitionists would still think
their ignorance is non culpable.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend a particular theory of culpable
ignorance and discuss what it entails about agents who are ignorant about climate
change. My more modest goal was to enrich previous discussions of this issue with
recent influential developments in work on the epistemic condition of moral
responsibility. One important upshot from this discussion is that among the woefully
large set of agents who are ignorant about climate change, there are different
verdicts that one can come to as to culpability. Another is that there may be strong
reasons to resist high degrees of confidence in our judgments given the number of
relevant factors and their subtlety. A safe, but still important conclusion one may
draw is that culpable ignorance about climate change may be widespread enough
that we are often warranted in blaming individuals for ignorantly contributing to the
realization of climate harms. But, we may just as often be misguided in directing our
blame at certain non-culpably ignorant individuals. If we want to avoid making the
same mistake that we are accusing such people of making, namely of acting from
ignorance that is culpable, we should be sure that we get all the relevant information
before proceeding to blame them.
Getting clarity on these issues also has broader implications for climate ethics for
at least two reasons. First, the issue of whether individuals who are contributing to
climate change are blameworthy is surely relevant to the project of putting the
theories developed by climate ethicists into practice. The various innovative
theories discussed in ‘‘The Problem’’ section give us the resources to sort individual
actions into the categories of right or wrong. But, surely it is just as important to
know of the actions categorized as wrong, which of them are performed by agents
who are the fair targets of our reactive attitudes. If many agents are non-culpably
ignorant about the reality and relevance of climate change, then though we have the
theoretical justification to say that what they did was wrong, we are not in a position
to hold it against them. Although Van de Poel et al. frame the following worry a bit
strongly, at least as far as the excuse of ignorance is concerned, their point is an
important one:
(I)t might very well be possible that no one can be fairly held blameworthy for
certain collective harms. In as far as retribution for such harms is considered
morally important, this gap might be considered morally problematic (2011,
p. 65).
Second, one important way of responding to this possibility and avoiding or at
least minimizing the problem that Van de Poel et al. call a ‘‘gap in responsibility
distribution’’ (p. 65) is to reduce the instances of ignorance about climate change.
Rather than amounting to a trite recommendation, a strong duty to reduce ignorance
would accompany any other theory that posits the existence of individual
obligations. Something that sets climate ethics apart from other fields of ethics is
that it often requires actions that require significant sacrifice and thus go beyond
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what common-sense ethics might recommend. If these demands are stringent, then it
would not be surprising if compliance was low.21
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